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JULIAN BARLOW, CHARLES 
CLEGG, and DIXIE CLEGG, 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
CHARLES KEENER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15609 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by a landlord to evict his tenant 
and to collect back rent and other damages incident to 
cleaning and restoring the premises, together with costs 
and the statutory penalty of treble damages. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon defendant's failure personally to appear at 
settlement conference as ordered by the court, judgment was 
entered for the plaintiffs for the sum of the rent due and 
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court costs. The motion of defendant's attorney for relief 
from judgment pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek dismissal of this appeal or in 
the alternative an affirmance of the judgment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Julian Barlow is the owner of improved 
real estate located at 758 Browning Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Plaintiffs Charles Clegg and Dixie Clegg are the 
agents of Mr. Barlow for purposes of leasing said property. 
On or about December 1, 1975, plaintiffs leased the 
premises to the defendant, Charles Keener, on a month-to-
month basis for an agreed rental of $85.00 per month to 
be paid in advance, along with an initial $25.00 cleaning 
deposit. 
The defendant and his family resided in the 
premises from December 1, 1975 until at least January 14, 
1976 when the complaint was filed in this action, but 
refused to pay the cleaning deposit and the rentals due in 
December, 1975 and in January, 1976. Plaintiffs duly 
noticed defendant on January 5, 1976 to pay the rent or to 
surrender the premises which defendant failed and refused 
to do. The plaintiffs then filed the complaint in this 
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action (Record, pp. 2, 3). 
Defendant filed an answer dated January 22, 1976 
prepared by his attorney Richard T. Black (Record, p. 5). 
On or before August 23, 1977 Jonathan H. King assumed the 
defense of the action and on said date moved to be allowed 
to amend the answer because "the above-entitled matter 
cannot be adequately defended in the absence of amending 
the answer." In the alternative, Mr. King moved to be 
allowed to withdraw as counsel should permission to amend 
be disallowed, again because "the above-entitled matter 
cannot be adequately defended by counsel unless leave to 
file an amended answer is granted." (Record, p. 16). 
Leave to amend was granted and the defendant's 
attorney added, among other things, the fourth defense 
appearing in the amended answer (Record, pp. 14, 15). 
On November 8, 1977 Judge Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. ordered 
that the parties and their counsel appear at a pretrial 
settlement conference to be held November 21, 1977 
(Record, p. 20). The defendant failed to personally appear 
on that date and his counsel admitted that his client had 
not maintained contact with him and that there was no 
prospect that the defendant would appear for trial (Record, 
p. 23). 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff moved for judgment against defendant 
which was granted by the court for two month's rent and 
for costs of $32.60 (Record, pp. 23, 24). Defendant's 
attorney subsequently moved for relief from judgment which 
was denied by Judge David B. Dee on December 30, 1977 
(Record, p. 28) . 
Defendant's attorney then prosecuted this appeal 
primarily to determine the narrow issues raised by the fourt~ 
defense of his amended complaint: whether a warranty of habit· 
ability is implied in a leasehold and if so, whether the same 
excuses defendant from paying rent. 
POINT I 
THIS APPEAL IS MOOT AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED WHERE THERE IS 
NO BASIS IN lITAH LAW THAT AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 
IS A DEFENSE TO NON-PAYMENT OF RENT 
In McRae v. Jackson, Utah 2d __ , 526 P.2d 1190, 
(1974), minors sued by their guardians to be allowed to obcai: 
drivers licenses. The trial court held for the minors. 
Defendant appealed, but in the interim the plaintiffs obtainec 
their licenses. This court, in holding the case to be moot 
and in dismissing the appeal, said: 
Although no Utah case precisely in point 
has been found, the general principle, to 
which we adhere, is stated in 5 Am.Jur. 2d, 
Appeal and Error, §761: "The function of 
appellate courts like that of courts generallv, 
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is not to give opinions on merely abstract 
or theoretical matters, but only to decide 
actual controversies injuriously affecting 
the rights of some party to the litigation, 
and it has been held that questions or cases 
which have become moot or academic are not 
a proper subject to review." .Id. at 1191. 
As will be seen below, there is absolutely no 
controversy remaining in this appeal prosecuted by the 
attorney for defendant. The defendant long ago abandoned 
the defense of the case and his counsel has had no contact 
with him for more than a year. Furthermore, there is 
absolutely no basis in the law of Utah or the facts of this 
case to protract these matters further. Two judges below 
have already passed upon the question of warranty and found 
it totally without merit. 
Here, there is no actual controversy between 
the litigants at this time. The plaintiffs 
have no practical interest in any disposition 
that could now be made by this court. This 
appeal presents simply an abstract question 
of law which does not rest upon existing facts 
or rights. Therefore, this court must, in 
the exercise of its discretion, dismiss the 
appeal on the simple ground that the case has 
become moot and is not of sufficient public 
interest, regardless of whether the trial court 
erred or not. .19.. at 1192 
The court in McRae restricted "public interest" 
issues to those involving "extraordinary circumstances" 
coupled with a class action, a constitutional interpreta-
tion question, the validity or construction of a statute 
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and the propriety of administrative rulings. This case 
deals with patently ordinary circumstances and does not 
involve any of those questions. 
Appellant's brief is almost totally devoted to 
arguing that a warranty of habitability should be part of 
a lease and that a breach of that warranty should be a 
defense to non-payment of rent by the tenant. The authori-
ties cited by appellant's attorney, however, are not the 
law of Utah. This court has not authorized such a warrant·1 
or defense, nor has the legislature of this state. The 
Appellant recognizes at page 4 of his brief that the cormnon 
law does not imply a warranty of habitability. By statutor·: 
mandate, the courts of Utah are to apply the common law: 
The common law of England so far as it is 
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the 
constitution or laws of the United States, 
or the constitution or laws of this state, 
and so far only as it is consistent with and 
adopted to the natural and physical conditions 
of this state and the necessities of the 
people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be 
the rule of decision in all the courts of this 
state. 68-3-1, U.C.A. 
At least one case decided by this court has 
implied that the common law rule not recognizing a warrant:: 
of habitability is perfectly consistent with the physical 
conditions of the state and necessities of the people. 
In Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, L'tah 
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567 P.2d 1102, (1977), a lessor sued to evict a month-
to-month lessee after she was duly served with notice. The 
tenant resisted by claiming the landlord was only evicting 
her for retaliatory purposes because she had attempted 
"to obtain better conditions for herself and other tenants." 
This court, however, decided the case on the basis of the 
rights guaranteed to property holders by the Utah Constitu-
tion: 
We are also concerned with the constitutional 
rights of the landlord. Our Utah Constitution, 
Article 1, Section 1 states: "All men have 
the inherent and inalienable right . . . to 
acquire, possess, and protect property .. 
. . . The question that must be confronted 
II 
and answered is: If the landlord cannot 
enforce the terms of his lease and proceed 
under the express provisions of our statutory 
law to reclaim his property, what has happened 
to his property rights? Id. at 1104, 1105 
This court affirmed an award of treble damages to 
the landlord. By implication, a recognition of an implied 
warranty of habitability would deprive a landlord of his 
property rights since he could not evict a tenant who 
asserted that defense even if duly noticed. 
Another Utah case has rejected the attendant 
proposition posed by defendant's attorney that covenants in 
a leasehold are mutually dependent. In King v. Firm, 
3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114, (1955) a tenant claimed to 
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be able to offset a debt owed to him by his landlord against 
the rent. In rejecting that argument, the court cited with 
approval the following passage from Williston on Contracts: 
~'**Where rent is due under a lease, the 
tenant must pay the rent even though he has 
been obligated to spend money on repairs 
which the landlord covenanted to make ... 
it cannot be said that the tenant has paid 
or tendered the rent due if he had deducted 
even a valid cross-claim. Id. at 1117 
The clear implication of this language is that a tenant may 
not unilaterally decide to decrease his rent in order to 
improve the premises or because of some other claim between 
the parties. 
Thus, as a matter of law, plaintiffs are entitled 
to judgment in this case. The only possible dispute--the 
condition of the premises--is irrelevant given the law of 
Utah which does not recognize the implied warranty of 
habitability as a defense to an action for rent. Defendant 
has not contested the fact that the rent is due and owing 
and in numerous places in his pleadings and brief has 
recognized that his case is indefensible without the implied 
warranty of habitability. The default judgment entered 
below should thus be affirmed or this appeal dismissed where 
no question remains to be resolved. The appeal is moot. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETIO~ AND JUDGMENT 
FOR PLAINTIFFS WAS PROPERLY ENTERED WHERE DEFENDANT HAS 
FAILED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH HIS COUNSEL AND HAS 
ABANDONED HIS DEFENSE 
Defendant's counsel has admitted to having no 
contact with his client since at least May, 1977 
(Appellant's brief, p. 2), and that no prospect exists that 
defendant would personally appear at trial. As a result 
of his willful absence, the defendant has failed to obey 
the trial court's order to appear for settlement conference. 
The defendant was warned by that order that sanctions for 
non-appearance were a distinct possibility: 
IF COUNSEL FAIL TO APPEAR OR IF SETTLEMENT 
EFFORTS ARE THWARTED BY THE NON-APPEARANCE 
OF A PARTY, ATTORNEYS FEES MAY BE ALLOWED 
TO OPPOSING PARTIES AND THE COURT MAY IMPOSE 
OTHER SANCTIONS AS MAY SEE[M] JUST IN THE 
CASE. 
Defendant's non-appearance, in the trial court's 
discretion, thwarted settlement efforts and the judgment 
was granted for plaintiff for the rents due and owing. 
Not only did defendant thwart settlement by 
disobeying a court order, but his failure to keep in contact 
with his attorney is further willful misconduct justifying the 
judgment entered. Without knowing the location of defendant, 
plaintiffs will be prejudiced in their efforts both in 
discoverv and at trial. It is now impossible that any 
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discovery be had directly from the defendant. Likewise, 
defendant could not be called as an adverse witness by 
plaintiffs. Such discovery or testimony could be 
crucial to plaintiff's case. Rule 37(b)(2)(C) authorizes 
various sanctions against disobedient parties i.ncl11ding 
judgment by default; defendant's disappearance and 
consequent disobedience t:i the settlement order is analogous 
to the situation under that rule. 
Speaking of a client's failure to maintain contact 
with his attorney, a recent case said: 
A defendant is under a duty to keep in touch 
with his attorney so that he can answer 
interrogatories or take any other action his 
attorney might find necessary pending litiga-
tion ... His failure to maintain such contact 
amounts to "conscious indifference to conse-
quence," which our courts equate with "willful 
misconduct." Sta-Power Industries, Inc. v. 
Avant, 134 Ga.App. 952, 216 S.E. 2d 897, 
902, 1975. 
That court entered default judgment where the 
party failed to comply with discovery requests due to loss 
of contact with his attorney. By analogy, where defendant 
has failed to obey a court order requiring his appearance 
at settlement conference and where his abandonment of his 
defense may prejudice future discovery efforts by plaintiffs, 
then the trial court did not abuse its discretion in enterb 
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judgment for plaintiffs. 
In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 
P.2d 741, (1953) the court affirmed a judgment by default 
and corranented on the propriety of reversing the same 
as follows: 
The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a 
creature of equity designed to relieve against 
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may 
occur through procedural difficulties, the 
wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes 
which prevent the presentation of a claim 
or defense. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure outlines the situations 
wherein a party may be relieved from a final 
judgment ... Equity considers factors which 
may be irrelevant in actions at law, such as 
the unfairness of a party's conduct, his 
delay in bringing or continuing the action, 
the hardship in granting or denying relief. 
Although an equity court no longer has complete 
discretion in granting or denying relief it 
may exercise wide judicial discretion in 
weighing the factors of fairness and public 
convenience, and this court on appeal will reverse 
the trial court only where an abuse of this dis-
cretion is clearly shown. ~· at 742. 
In the case now before the court, two judges have 
approved the entry of default judgment against the defendant. 
Defendant has personally abandoned his defense, and while 
plaintiffs have no direct evidence to the effect that 
defendant's attorney is merely proceeding with this case as a 
substitute for legislative action, the primary inference to 
be drawn from the unwarranted protraction of this simple 
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action by a landlord for two months rent could be no other. 
The lower courts have twice held, in essence, that in 
fairness to the plaintiffs and in the interest of public 
convenience, that is, relieving the schedules of the courts 
of this state from further consideration of a case so 
patently without merit, that default judgment was a proper 
remedy. 
The rule that the courts will incline towards 
granting relief to a party who has not had 
opportunity to present his case is ordinarily 
applied at the trial court level, and this 
court will not reverse the trial court where 
it appears ... that all elements were 
considered, merely because the motion could 
have been granted. Warren, at 744. 
The law of Utah does not recognize the defense 
advanced by defendant's attorney and the defendant has 
himself abandoned all contact with his attorney. In the 
words of the court in Chrysler v. Chrvsler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 
303 P. 2d 995, (1956): 
Manifestly the court should not follow the 
rule of indulgence toward the party in default 
when the effect would be to work an injustice 
or inequity upon the opposing party. A prime 
requisite precedent to the granting of such 
relief is that the movant demonstrate that he 
comes to the court with clean hands and in good 
faith. l3.· at 996, 997 
In this case the defendant has engaged in "willL: 
misconduct" by abandoning his defense and further proceedin:' 
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in this case would only work additional injustice and 
inequity upon the plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's willful misconduct in not staying 
in contact with his attorney, his consequent disobedience 
to an order to appear for pretrial settlement, and the 
implicit admission in defendant's brief that the rent 
is owing coupled with the law of Utah which recognizes 
no implied warranty of habitability as a defense to an 
action for rent compel the conclusion that this appeal 
is moot and should be dismissed or in the alternative that 
the discretion of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN,GARDINER,JENSEN & EVANS 
(}m-(((2~ 
Jay E. Jensen•/w-
Scott R. Jenkins 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing respondents' 
brief was served on counsel for the appellant, Jonathan H. 
King, 352 South Denver, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by 
I -
mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, on the _.'.____day 
of May, 1978. 
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